be directive and deviate from the tradition of nondirectiveness." Physicians were advised to recognize bias in their own opinions about abortion, Down syndrome, and so on, and if such bias existed, to refer to a genetics counselor for pretest counseling.

Now, I suppose it is possible that, somehow, research has shown a tendency toward improved maternal and fetal health among pregnant women who are not subjected to bias for or against abortion, Down syndrome, or other related subjects, when counseled regarding prenatal testing. It is possible but clearly very unlikely, and in any event, no such claim was made by the authors. It is not illegal to express such bias (yet). One is therefore left with the assumption that somehow the authors consider it inappropriate, unethical, or immoral to "be directive and deviate from the tradition of nondirectiveness" when counseling regarding prenatal testing.

Several questions immediately arise. Whose tradition would be violated? The genetics counselors'? Is this tradition supported by any research into outcomes? Is it supported by any ethical reasoning? Let's be clear: the authors are recommending that, under certain circumstances, a referral is warranted. The referral is not being recommended on the grounds of lack of clinical competency or technical skills, or because a certain specialty is likely to have better clinical outcomes when handling a particular problem. So why is a referral being recommended? Why is being directive bad during genetics counseling when it is routine in other clinical circumstances? No physician thinks twice about being directive when recommending an appendectomy or a coronary artery bypass surgery. Why is counseling concerning prenatal testing any different? Another question concerns directiveness itself. Is there something wrong with being directive? If so, why are the authors being directive by directing us not to be directive? I don't want to be disingenuous. I strongly suspect the real point the authors are trying to make is that service.

The patient autonomy principle, while more widely acknowledged, is also philosophically questionable. Even if one accepts it at face value, however, many clinicians will acknowledge that there are two persons involved in a pregnancy, not one. My personal autonomy does not give me the right to do anything I want with my own body if, in so doing, I injure someone else. If the unborn is a human being, then it is immoral to kill him, since that would violate his personal autonomy. One can take the position that the unborn is not human. This position is illogical. Even those who reject the logic supporting the personhood of the unborn, however, must at least acknowledge the contentiousness of this issue. It is, again, inappropriate to make clinical recommendations that are based on a bias concerning such a contentious issue without acknowledging that bias.

Jeremy Klein, MD
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The above letter was referred to the authors of the article in question, who offer the following reply.

To the Editor: Nondirectiveness does have a long tradition for genetic service providers (both genetic counselors and clinical geneticists) in the United States. Nondirectiveness requires sharing all the relevant facts with the patient, but not telling the patient what to do. The issue is not that directiveness per se is bad, but that it is inappropriate in certain situations, including most genetic and prenatal diagnosis situations. Usually in prenatal diagnosis, the physician's knowledge, experience, and wisdom are not the most important factors in deciding a course of action; rather, it is the patient's beliefs and values. Thus, if a provider cannot assist the patient in recognizing his or her core beliefs and determining what course of action is most comfortable for that patient, the provider should refer to someone else who can provide that service.

Sarah Cate, MD, MPH
Susie Ball, MS
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The study focused on predictors of screening for breast, cervical, colorectal, and prostatic cancer by Ruffin and colleagues. In an audit of community-based primary care practices, they made three key observations and one key interpretation. They observed that screening rates were suboptimal, that the strongest predictor of screening was scheduling a health maintenance visit, and that less than one third of patients have annual health maintenance examinations. These observations are in agreement with another community-based primary care audit of about 75,000 adults. Ruffin et al interpreted their findings to suggest that the promotion of an annual visit to a health care provider to focus on preventive services is likely to increase the screening recommendations provided to patients and subsequent delivery of preventive services.
I would like to suggest that this proposed strategy is inefficient, costly, and unlikely to be successful. An alternative strategy to offer preventive services during acute care visits will efficiently increase delivery to a greater proportion of patients at a lower cost. This latter strategy has proved to be effective in a single primary care practice and is currently being tested in a large community-based multisite, multispecialty group practice. A randomized trial of the competing strategies would also appear to be feasible.

I also agree with Dr. Paul Frame, who stated in an accompanying editorial that "a system for delivering preventive services should be a requirement for accreditation of family practice residency programs."

David L. Hahn, MD
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References

The above letter was referred to the first author of the article in question, who offers the following reply.

To the Editor: Dr. Hahn raises a valid issue. Is it feasible to promote visits to primary care offices just for preventive issues? Dr. Hahn has written that it is not feasible and still have time to care for sick patients. This conclusion was arrived at by assuming that each primary care physician would spend 30 additional minutes each year performing a complete physical examination for approximately 54,000 patients currently seen for acute care. This conclusion, however, has several assumptions. The first is that the acute care visits would remain the same. There is no evidence to support this assumption, and many have hypothesized that acute care visits would decrease. The second is that a complete physical examination is preventive service. On the contrary, preventive services are not complete physical examinations; a complete physical examination has not proved to be an effective preventive service. Third, one appointment for preventive services might be enough to facilitate the delivery of preventive services in future acute care visits. The literature has reported that ever having been seen for a health maintenance examination is predictive of getting preventive services and being current. So, it might take only one such visit to implement a system that can address preventive services at other contacts.

All of us who struggle in the field of increasing the delivery of preventive services must be cautious with our interpretation of the published data. The literature has many examples of interventions that made significant changes—in one office, in academic settings, when focused on one specific preventive service, or within a short period of time. In contrast, the large randomized controlled trials of theoretically sound interventions have shown no effects to minimal changes in the delivery of preventive services in community-based primary care offices across several years. This was recently confirmed at the annual meeting of the North American Primary Care Research Group. Four presentations focused on randomized clinical trials of different interventions to increase the delivery of preventive services. All reported no effect to minimal increases. All the published and presented studies have not been trying to increase office visits solely for preventive services. All have taken the approach of increasing the delivery of preventive services at all encounters.

With these failures, I conclude it is time for some radical reexamination of preventive services and changing primary care practices. From this perspective, one question Dr. Hahn's conclusions that it is not feasible to promote encounters only for preventive services. It might actually decrease acute care visits and increase preventive services. Dr. Hahn's limited trial warrants replication in larger settings for a longer period. In addition, our understanding of the black box of practice behavior and changing practice behaviors is in the infancy stage. There is a need for more basic research into the variables that contribute to the behaviors of a community-based primary care practice. This information will guide the next generation of interventions. I agree with Dr. Frame, it is time for residency accreditation agencies and practicing physician certification groups to focus on measures of health status among the populations served by family physicians of which preventive services delivered is critical.

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References